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Article 9

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, No. 3
Legislation
Comment

THE NEBRASKA CONDOMINIUM
PROPERTY ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth in urban population has caused a scarcity
of land suitable for residential purposes and an increase in the
price of available land. As a result, many individuals have been
forced to sacrifice the conveniences and financial advantages of
home ownership for the more easily obtainable rented apartment.
In an attempt to provide for home ownership in areas of limited
land resources, a new concept called "condominium" has been
introduced into American real property.
The condominium involves the fee simple ownership of an
apartment. A multiunit project is subdivided into individually
owned units conveyed in fee simple with a proportionate interest
in those parts of the project to be commonly used by all unit
owners. The legal effect is that each unit owner holds title to a
cubical of space enclosed by the walls of his unit, the structure
itself being retained as a common element.' Thus, even though
the structure itself is destroyed, the subject matter of the fee
continues to exist.
There are two types of condominium, horizontal and vertical,
the former being the most prevalent. The horizontal condominium
resembles the ordinary apartment dwelling with each apartment
being individually conveyed. The vertical condominium is a tract
of land with individual buildings, the space enclosed by each
building being conveyed in fee. In both projects, the land and
structures are held in common and conveyed in conjunction with
the individual unit.
Although some European countries have used condominiums
for some time, the concept is a recent innovation in the United
States. 2 Like any new development in the law, the condominium
At this
concept involves some uncertain legal consequences.
writing, no reported court decision has been found involving conREv. STAT. § 76-802(2) (Supp. 1963) defines "apartment" as "an
enclosed space consisting of one or more rooms." (Emphasis added.)

NEB.
2

For the history of the condominium concept, see Cribbet, Condominium
-Home Ownership for Megalopolis?, 61 MftcH. L. REv. 1207 (1963).
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dominiums, and only tenuous analogies can be drawn from other
areas of the law.3 To combat this legal uncertainty and to provide a stable foundation for condominium investment, over thirty
states have passed condominium statutes
since 1961. In 1963, the
4
Nebraska Legislature followed suit.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the concept of condominium, explain some of the legal problems involved, and determine if the Nebraska statute adequately solves them. Although
condominiums could be used for residence, office, industry, business, or any combination thereof, this article will be focused
primarily on horizontal residential condominiums, with infrequent
references to the other types.
II. THE CONDOMINIUM CONCEPT
A condominium consists of three separate entities: the individual units, the common elements, and the limited common
elements. Each individual unit is held in fee simple with all the
incidents of ownership, and may be conveyed, encumbered, devised, or given away independently of other units.5
In addition to his interest in his individual unit, each coowner has a proportionate undivided interest in the common elements, 6 that proportion being determined by the percentage of the
value of his unit to the value of the entire project. The percentage
is fixed at the inception of the condominium regime and can be
altered only by unanimous consent of all co-owners. 7 This percentage also establishes the proportion of common expenses to be
paid by each unit owner s and the weight of the vote of each
8 For a discussion of the common law approach to condominiums, see

Comment, 50 CAIr. L. REV. 299 (1962).
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-801 to -823 (Supp. 1963). The Nebraska act was
taken in part from the condominium statutes of Arkansas, Florida,
Utah, and Colorado. Interview With Nebraska State Senator Michael
P. Russillo, Dec. 15, 1964.
5 NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-804 (Supp. 1963).
6 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-802(6) (Supp. 1963). This statute defines "common element" to include the land, structures, other specified areas, and
"all other elements of the building rationally of common use or necessary to its existence, upkeep and safety."
7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-806 (Supp. 1963).
8 The act establishes as common expenses:
(1) lawful assessments;
4

(2) expenses of administration, maintenance, repair or replacement of
common elements; and (3) other expenses agreed upon by the co-owners. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-802(13) (Supp. 1963).
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owner in the administration of the project. 9 The value thus determined is fixed for these sole purposes, but does not preclude
each co-owner from establishing a different value on his unit for
purposes of sale, mortgaging, or taxation. 0 The undivided share
in the common elements passes as an incident of the unit and
cannot be separated therefrom," and, although the co-owners
hold these elements as tenants in common, partition is expressly
forbidden by the act. 12 This is essential in a condominium to insure cooperative use of the property.'3
A common area which is or may be used exclusively by certain units may be designated by the co-owners as a limited common element. 14 The co-owners of these units would then be solely
responsible for its upkeep. Thus, in a multistory apartment condominium, the tenth floor hallway may be reserved for the exclusive use of units on the tenth floor by designating it a limited
common element.
0 NEB.

REV. STAT. § 76-815 (Supp. 1963).
Throughout other sections of
the act, voting percentage requirements differ according to the subject
matter involved. These requirements are set out below in order to
clarify later discussion:
(1) A vote of owners representing a majority of the value of the
project is required to:
(a) adopt decisions of the association (§ 76-820);
(b) provide for blanket insurance protection (§ 76-820); or
(c) determine provisions for reconstruction in lieu of a provision in the bylaws (§ 76-821).
(2) A vote of owners representing two-thirds of the value of the
project is required to modify the system of administration (§ 76-816).
(3) A vote of owners representing three-fourths of the value of
the project is required to:
(a) sell the entire project (§ 76-812);
(b) waive the condominium regime (§ 76-812); or
(c) reconstruct after two-thirds of the building has been destroyed (§ 76-821).
(4) A unanimous vote is required to:
(a) designate limited common elements (§ 76-802(7)); or
(b) change pro rata valuation of each unit (§ 76-806).
(5) The statute is unclear as to the vote required to designate
common expenses under § 76-802(13) (c). This provision would probably be construed to be a decision of the association under § 76-820,
and thus require a majority vote.
10 NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-806 (Supp. 1963).

11

NEB.

REv.

STAT.

§ 76-811 (Supp. 1963).

12

NEB. REV.

STAT.

§ 76-807 (Supp. 1963).

13 Note, 31 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 1014, 1030 (1963).
14 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-802(7) (Supp. 1963).
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Although incorporation is possible, many of the recently
formed condominiums have been organized as unincorporated
associations. 15 Each co-owner is automatically a member of this
association, which governs the condominium. In addition to the
association of co-owners, many condominiums appoint a board of
directors with management experience to operate the project. 6
The Nebraska act requires at least three co-owners to be on the
17
board.
III. CONDOMINIUM VS. CONVENTIONAL COOPERATIVE
In the conventional cooperative apartment, a corporation
holds title to the land and building while the tenant-owner holds
a block of stock in that corporation and a lease to his particular
apartment. The rights and obligations of each unit owner are
established by lease, charter, and bylaws.' 8 A cooperative apartment generally is under a blanket mortgage, with taxes being
assessed on a lump sum basis.
The condominium offers several advantages over the conventional cooperative, the most noteworthy of which is the financial
independence of the co-owners. In cooperatives with a blanket
mortgage and tax assessment, a few financially irresponsible

tenants can jeopardize the entire project. If one tenant fails to
pay the mortgage assessment, the other owners are faced with the
dilemma of either paying the defaulting tenant's share or allowing
foreclosure of the entire project. In a condominium, each unit is
separately mortgaged and taxed, which eliminates the possibility
of a blanket foreclosure. Also, mortgagees are likely to look with
favor on this arrangement, since it will allow them to evaluate

their risk with a greater degree of predictability and to spread that
risk over the separate units. 19 Financial independence also allows
15 The major advantage of incorporation lies in limiting the personal

liability of the unit owners. But see note 86 infra and accompanying
text.
16 "Many attorneys, lenders, and developers in this field believe that professional management offers the necessary guidance and experience to
successfully operate a large condominium." Comment, 37 So. CAL. L.
REv. 82, 94 (1964).
17 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-802(5) (Supp. 1963).
18 Although cooperatives can be found with various forms of organiza-

'9

tion and management, the stock-lease form of.ownership seems to be
the most prevalent. See Comment, 17 U. MAUV L. REV. 145 (1962).
Mr. John Binning, a Lincoln attorney representing the Nebraska Mortgage Association before the Committee on Judiciary, testified: "Our
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the unit owner a more flexible method of financing, i.e., debt
reduction, refinancing, or resale not possible under a blanket
mortgage. 20 In an area of rising real estate prices, the condominium unit owner will realize a capital gain on resale of his unit,
while the cooperative tenant usually is forced to sell his unit
back to the corporation at the original purchase price.
Like the conventional cooperative, the condominium provides
a lower pro rata share of operating and maintenance expense than
the cost of renting comparable housing. 21 The landlord's profit
also is eliminated, and savings through mass purchasing of supplies, utilities, and labor are passed on to each co-owner. High
land costs are also spread over many units.
The following have been suggested as disadvantages of the
condominium as compared to conventional cooperatives: 22 (1) the
23
complexity of the legal device necessary for condominiums;
(2) the lack of control over undesirable members arising out of
fee simple ownership; 24 and (3) the legal problems undeveloped
by case law peculiar to any new legal concept. 25 These are not,
however, inherent in the condominium concept, and could be
eliminated, for the most part, by a carefully drawn statute or
bylaw.
6

2
IV. FHA MORTGAGE INSURANCE

Investors in condominium projects gained added incentive
members include Insurance, Mortgage, Investment, Title Insurance and
Securities Companies, Banks and Trusts, and Savings & Loan Associations. Their interest in this bill is that they would like to have this
type of home ownership concept approved in Nebraska. We try to
hold our loan money at home." Hearings Before the Committee on
the Judiciary on L.B. 288, 73d Neb. Leg. Sess. 3 (April 24, 1963). See
also Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 987, 998 (1963).
20 Id. at 994.
21 Ramsey, Condominium, The New Look in Cooperative Building, in PRoCEEDINGs, ABA SEcTIoN OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAw,
PART H 4, 6 (August 6-7, 1962).
22 See Cribbet, supra note 2, at 1240.
23 This should be no more complex under the Nebraska act than it is in
a stock-lease cooperative, since the cooperative would be required to
comply with incorporation procedures.
24 See text accompanying notes 71-80 infra.
25 See conclusion infra.
26 Extensive commentary is already available on FHA regulations concerning condominiums and need not be repeated here. For a complete
comparison of the FHA condominium to the FHA cooperative, see
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with the passage of the National Housing Act of 1961,27 which
allowed the Federal Housing Administration to insure mortgages
on horizontal residential condominiums. 28 Conventional coopera29
tives had previously been included.
To obtain FHA insurance on individual unit mortgages under
section 234 of the FHA regulations, the entire project must have
been originally under an FHA insured project mortgage provided
for in other sections of the regulations. 30 This project mortgage
may then be converted into individual unit mortgages after presentation to the commissioner of an enabling deed and a recorded
and binding plan of condominium ownership. This plan must
contain items specifically enumerated in the regulations, such as
provisions for blanket insurance protection, individual tax assessment, and covenants of co-owners to pay common expenses.
Also, at least eighty per cent of the total value of the project must
be conveyed to FHA approved unit owners, although no unit
owner may own more than four units covered by insured mortgages, one of which must be his own residence. If these requirements are met to the approval of the commissioner, he may voluntarily terminate the project mortgage and convert it into in31
dividual unit mortgages.
V. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONDOMINIUM
The owner or owners of the project declare their intention
of establishing a condominium under the Nebraska act by recording a master deed which must contain: (1) a description of the
land and building; (2) a general description locating and identifying each apartment; (3) a description of the general and common
elements; (4) the value of the property and each apartment's percentage of that value; and (5) all covenants, restrictions, and
conditions relating to the regime.3 2 Attached to the master deed
must be a plan certified by an architect or engineer showing
Note, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1014 (1963).

See also Comment, 50 CAIM.

L. REV. 299 (1962).

75 Stat. 160 (1961), 12 U.S.C. § 1715(y) (Supp. V, 1963). For regulations see 24 C.F.R. § 234 (1962).
28 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(a) (1962).
29 24 C.F.R. § 213 (1962).
30 The project mortgage would probably be insured under 24 C.F.R. § 220
27

(1962)

(urban renewal mortgage insurance), or 24 C.F.R. § 207 (1962)

(multifamily housing mortgage insurance). See also MacEllven &
Eagen, Condominium-A Symposium, 41 TITLE NEWS 28, 40 (1962).
31 The entire conversion procedure is set out in 24 C.F.R. § 234.26 (1962).
82 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-809 (Supp. 1963).
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graphically all particulars of the building, and this graphic illustration is conclusively presumed to illustrate the actual boundaries of each apartment. 33 Since a unit actually consists of enclosed space, 34 the normal settling of the building would cause
defects in titles, resulting in either trespasses or the necessity for
a series of mutual easements. A graphic floor plan of each
owner's apartment is not subject to such difficulty. 35 Each apartment shown on the plan must be either numbered or lettered,
and any instrument affecting title to a unit bearing the appropriate number or letter with the words "in ----------- Condominium
Property Regime" is deemed
to be a sufficient description of that
6
3

unit for all purposes.

A condominium regime is governed by bylaws which may be
adopted by co-owners representing two-thirds of the total value
37
of the building. These bylaws are not effective until recorded,
but once recorded run with the land and "bind all coowners,
tenants of such owners, employees and any other persons who use
the property, including the persons who acquire the interest of
any coowner through foreclosure, enforcement of any lien or
otherwise.138 The Nebraska act enumerates five specific items
which must be provided for in the bylaws. 39
VI. COMMON ELEMENTS AND EXPENSES
Each co-owner must pay his pro rata share of all common
expenses. 40 No co-owner can refuse to pay these expenses by
waiving the use or enjoyment of the common elements or by
abandoning his apartment. 41 These expenses are enforced by a
33 NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 76-810 (Supp. 1963).

34 NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 76-802(2)

(Supp. 1963).

35 "Perhaps the best approach to this problem is that taken by Nebraska
whose act provides that a copy of the floor plans be filed and that
there is a conclusive presumption that the actual boundaries of the
apartment are the legal boundaries." Legislation Note, 13 DE PAUL
L. REV. 111, 113 (1964).
36 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-811 (Supp. 1963).

§ 76-814 (Supp. 1963).
§ 76-809(5) (Supp. 1963).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-815 (Supp. 1963) requires:
(1) form of administration; (2) regulations for meetings of co-owners; (3) care, upkeep,
and surveillance of the building; (4) manner of collecting common
expenses; and (5) designation and dismissal of personnel.
See text accompanying notes 6-13 supra.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-817 (Supp. 1963).

37 NEB. REV.

STAT.

38 NEB. REV. STAT.
39

40
41
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lien in favor of the association on the individual apartment, with
preference over all other liens and encumbrances except tax liens,
42
tax assessments, and duly recorded mortgage or lien instruments.
If the apartment is sold with common expenses outstanding,
such expenses are first paid out of the sales price or by the vendee
in preference over all encumbrances except tax liens, 43tax assessments, and duly recorded mortgage or lien instruments.
A vendee is jointly and severally liable with the vendor for
unpaid common expenses which accrued before the conveyance,
but retains the right of reimbursement from the vendor. 44 Although the Nebraska act requires a lien for unpaid common expenses to be recorded, a vendee is jointly and severally liable on
all outstanding amounts, whether a lien is recorded or not.45 Yet
no provision is made for a potential vendee to examine the records
of the management for any outstanding assessments. Evidently,
he is at the mercy of the board of directors in this respect. Under
this arrangement, abstract companies, title examiners, and attorneys must either insist that these records be made available or
obtain an estoppel certificate from the management. 46 To facilitate transferability of the unit apartments, provisions should be
made either in the bylaws or by statute requiring the board to
make the record of assessments available to potential48 purchasers. 47 Most condominium statutes have such a provision.
The proportionate value of a unit to the total value of the
project, which is established at the inception of the condominium,
49
can only be altered by unanimous consent of the co-owners.

42

Ibid.

43

NEB. REV.
NEB. REV.

44

45
46
47

§ 76-818 (Supp. 1963).
§ 76-819 (Supp. 1963).
Ibid. The statute refers only to "amounts owing" rather than to
recorded liens.
See Comment, 17 U. Mumi L. REv. 145 (1962).
Minnesota added to a statute making a vendee jointly and severally
liable the following provision: "However, any such grantee shall be
entitled to a statement from the manager or board of directors, as
the case may be, setting forth the amount of the unpaid assessments
against the grantor and such grantee shall not be liable for, nor shall
the apartment conveyed be subject to a lien for any unpaid assessments against the grantor in excess of the amount therein set forth."
MItNN. STAT. ANN. § 515.24 (Supp. 1964).
Accord, Mic. STAT. ANN.
STAT.
STAT.

§ 26.50(21)
48

(Supp. 1963).

Kerr, Condominium--Stcztutory Implementation, 38 ST. Jomexs L.
REv. 1, 13 (1963).
STAT. § 76-806 (Supp. 1963).

49 NEB. REV.
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This proportionate valuation is universally used in determining
the percentage of common expenses to be paid by each unit owner, his percentage of ownership in the common elements, and the
weight of his vote in the management of the project. As a practical matter, this percentage will never be changed. Any unit
owner who is in any way burdened by a change in the percentage
of his unit has the power to veto the alteration under a unanimous consent requirement. If a change in this percentage is
deemed necessary for the sound operation of condominiums, a
more liberal procedure must be adopted.
Whether value is the proper basis at all, however, depends
upon the purpose for which that basis is used. It can best be
justified in determining the weight of the vote of each unit
owner, for the owner with the most invested has the most to lose
by mismanagement of the project. Since actual value does not
remain constant and the weight of the vote should be proportioned to such value, a flexible method of changing the percentage
originally established should be incorporated into the statute. 50
Proportionate value is less justified as a basis for determining
a unit owner's share of common expenses and common elements.
An increase in the value of one apartment would not increase the
expense of maintaining common elements such as hallways and
staircases. The maintenance costs of such areas for the most part
will not vary, so each unit owner's assessment for such maintenance should be determined on a nonvariable basis. Also, since
a co-owner should ideally bear the cost of maintaining his percentage share of common elements, the same basis should be used
to determine both. The percentage of cubic feet owned by one
owner in relation to the number of cubic feet in the entire
project would be particularly applicable to this situation, since
such a percentage would not change.
Proportionate value likewise has little relation to the amount
of utilities consumed and other like expenses. Although many
utilities may be metered directly to individual apartments, the coowners may install central services to lower costs. A central
heating unit rather than individual furnaces would be a common
example. To determine such expenses, extent of use would be the
most appropriate basis, provided adequate measuring devices
were available.
50

To provide for the alteration of this percentage, a statute could allow
for periodic appraisal. The statute should also determine the binding
effect of such an appraisal and provide for arbitration if the appraisers
do not agree.
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It would seem that, in determining which basis is the most
reasonable for assessing common expenses, the nature of the expense should be the controlling factor. It would be cumbersome,
if not impossible, for a statute to provide the basis for each of the
innumerable types of expenses which might develop. For this
reason, the determination should be left with the co-owners.5 1
There may be common profits as well as common expenses.
Such profits could arise by leasing apartments owned by the
association or by making assessments which are greater than
common expenses. The Nebraska act does not refer to these
profits, so a provision 52for disposition of such funds should be
included in the bylaws.
Although a lien in favor of the association may be enforced
against an individual unit if a co-owner does not contribute
toward common expenses, 53 the Nebraska act is silent as to a
mechanic's or materialman's lien on common elements. If a
blanket lien is allowed, all unit titles are affected. Thus, even if
one unit owner paid his share, the lien would not be removed
until all unit owners had contributed or until the association had
satisfied the debt. This is contrary to the policy of financial
independence which the condominium concept was designed to
effectuate. Many states have attempted to solve this problem in
their condominium acts. The most common provision prohibits
liens against the common elements, but allows materialmen and
laborers to file individual liens against each unit for each coowner's share.5 4 Thus, a co-owner can remove the lien against
his unit without being dependent on other co-owners. In New
York, the mechanic or materialman is entirely deprived of his
lien, but acquires a beneficial interest in a trust consisting of
common charges received and to be received by the association
managers. No money may be expended for any other purpose by
51 A statute requiring a footage basis for the percentage of ownership of
common elements and the share in common expenses related to such
common elements would be necessary. All other expenses should be
paid on a basis determined by a majority of the co-owners.
52 New York defines common profits as the excess of all receipts of the
rents, profits, and revenues from the common elements remaining after
the deduction of the common expenses. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAw § 339-e
(6). These common profits are then distributed to the co-owners pursuant to their percentage of the common elements. N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 339-m. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515.10 (Supp. 1964).
5s NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-817 (Supp. 1963).
. § 499B.12 (Supp. 1964); MINN. STAT. ANx. § 515.09
54 IowA CoDEA
(Supp. 1964).
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the managers until the mechanic or materialman is fully paid.55
Either solution adequately solves the problem, but the New York
method seems more equitable. Instead of placing the burden and
expense of filing individual liens on the mechanic or materialman,
the expense is shifted to the association, which must then file its
own liens on each unit.
VII. INSURANCE
Careful planning is necessary to develop an adequate program of casualty insurance for condominiums. The Nebraska act
allows the purchase of a blanket insurance policy if required in
the master deed or bylaws, or with the approval of co-owners
owning a majority of the value of the project. The act also allows
each unit owner to purchase an individual insurance policy covering his own unit.56
Premiums for the blanket policy are included in common
expenses. As already indicated, common expenses are assessed in
the percentage established at the inception of the project, and a
later change in this percentage under the present act is unlikely. 57 If one unit owner greatly increases the value of his unit,
the premium on the blanket policy will rise without a corresponding rise in the assessment of that unit owner. This results in
some unit owners paying for another's insurance coverage. New
York has adopted the following provision with respect to insurance premiums:
[P]remiums for such insurance on the building shall be deemed
common expenses, provided, however, that in charging the same
to the unit owners consideration may be 5given
to the higher
premium rates on some units than on others. 8
The Nebraska act should be amended accordingly. 59
55 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-1(2).
56 NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-820 (Supp. 1963).

See text accompanying note 49 supra.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-bb.
59 Adoption of the New York provision would also require amendment
of § 76-821 of the Nebraska act, which now provides that, if the
building is destroyed and not reconstructed, the insurance indemnity
is divided among the co-owners "in accordance with their interests as
determined in the master deed." In other words, the proceeds would
be distributed in the percentage of the value of the unit to the value
of the entire project as originally established. Thus, the result would
be an equitable assessment of the insurance costs with an inequitable
disbursement of the insurance proceeds. The proceeds should be
divided in accordance with the percentage of the premium paid.
57
58
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Coordination of insurance coverage is essential in a condominium situation where there may be both blanket and individual
coverage. The difficulty has best been phrased by Professor
Rohan in his article on condominium insurance:
A key feature of the condominium insurance format-the separate
mortgaging of individual units-raises the distinct possibility of
overlapping policies, as unit owners, their mortgagees, and the
association of unit owners all seek protection. Resolution of the
exact role of each with respect to the purchase of insurance and
the disposition of proceeds is essential to avoid duplication of
premiums, gaps in coverage, and needless discouragement of institutional mortgagee participation in the condominium field. 00
This is not to say, however, that dual coverage is inadvisable.

Good arguments have been made for both blanket and individual
coverage, which leads to the conclusion that an integrated system
including both would give the best results. It has been suggested
in support of blanket coverage that the association is the only
entity having the capacity and authority to restore all damaged
areas and to secure payment for the contractors engaged.61 Blanket coverage also would guarantee the continuity of the project at
the lowest per unit cost. On the other hand, if the roof and the
top three stories of a ten story condominium are destroyed by fire
and the blanket insurance policy is not sufficient to insure the entire loss, the association of co-owners will undoubtedly vote to
apply the insurance proceeds to reconstruction of the roof and
other common elements before reconstructing the individual unit.
62
This makes a strong case for supplemental individual insurance.
It is true that, if the blanket policy is sufficient, this problem does
not arise, and there is no reason why such a policy could not be
maintained. However, many individual unit owners may be
reluctant to entrust the responsibility of keeping adequate insurance protection to the association, for to do so would involve
financial dependence on other unit owners. If this is the case, the

unit owners who do purchase individual insurance policies will
then be reluctant to pay for total blanket protection. This dilemma can possibly be solved by placing the burden of uninsured
losses on all unit owners. 63

60 Rohan, Disruption of the Condominium Venture: The Problems of
Casualty Loss and Insurance, 64 COLum. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1964).
61 Id. at 1050.
62 Mixon, Apartment Ownership in Texas: Cooperative and Condominium, 1 HOUSTON L. REv. 226, 250 (1964).
63 See text accompanying notes 68-70 infra.
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VIII. DESTRUCTION OF THE PREMISES
Space is neither created nor destroyed. Coupled with the condominium concept, this principle results in various legal complications when the building enclosing an individual's space is destroyed either in part or in its entirety. The Nebraska statute is
susceptible of several reasonable interpretations with regard to
this problem, which leaves many attendant uncertainties. The two
pertinent sections are set out below with introductory numbers
added to facilitate reference in the subsequent discussion.
(1) 76-821. In case of fire or any other disaster the insurance
indemnity shall, except as provided in the next succeeding paragraph of this section, be applied to reconstruct the building.
(2) Reconstruction shall not be compulsory where it comprises
the whole or more than two-thirds of the building. In such case,
and unless otherwise agreed upon by three-fourths of the coowners, within one hundred twenty days after such damage or
destruction, the regime is waived, and the property shall be subject to a partition action and may be sold, and the proceeds, along
with the insurance indemnity, if any, shall be delivered to the

coowners in accordance with their interests as determined in the

master deed.
(3) Should it be proper to proceed with the reconstruction, the
provisions for such eventuality made in the by-laws shall be observed, or in lieu thereof,
the decision of the association of co64
owners shall prevail.
(4) 76-822. Where the building is not insured or where the
insurance idemnity is insufficient to cover the cost of reconstruction, the new building costs shall be paid by all the coowners
directly affected by the damage, in proportion to the value of their
respective apartments, or as may be provided by said by-laws;
and if any one or more of those composing the minority shall
refuse to make such payment, the majority may proceed with the
reconstruction at the expense of all the coowners benefited thereby upon proper resolution setting forth the circumstances of the
case and the costs of the works, with the intervention of the as-

sociation of coowners.
(5)

The provisions of this section may be changed by unani-

mous resolution of the association of coowners, adopted subsequent to the date on which the fire or other disaster occurred. 65

A possible interpretation of these provisions is that section
76-821 in its entirety applies when the insurance indemnity is
inadequate. The division into separate sections seems to lead to
this conclusion. Also, (3) provides that reconstruction will proceed according to provisions in the bylaws, but (4) sets up a
64 NEB.

REV. STAT. § 76-821 (Supp. 1963).

65 NEB.

REv.

STAT.

§ 76-822 (Supp. 1963).
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specific statutory plan to follow. To give meaning to both sections, (3) must apply when the insurance is adequate and (4) must
apply when the insurance is inadequate. This interpretation,
however, would require mandatory reconstruction in the second
instance.
The statutes also may be applied concurrently to both situations. This would mean that, regardless of the sufficiency of
insurance indemnity, reconstruction must be approved under (2)
and, if thus approved, would proceed under the provisions of (4).
The insertion of the words "if any" in (2), referring to insurance
proceeds, supports this interpretation. Under such an interpretation, if more than two-thirds of the building is destroyed and the
insurance indemnity is inadequate, it will require a three-fourths
vote under (2) to reconstruct, a two-thirds vote under (3) to
determine the provisions for reconstruction with a bylaw, a majority vote under (3) to determine provisions for reconstruction in
lieu of a bylaw,66 and a majority vote under (4) to proceed with
reconstruction.
Condominium investors and owners cannot afford the uncertainty created by two reasonable interpretations of a statute designed to regulate the disbursement of large amounts of money or
property. One of the greatest disadvantages of the condominium
is its lack of legal certainty. Sections 76-821 and 76-822 fall far
short of providing that certainty. They also leave several details
to implication. The allowance of a partition action in the event of
waiver of the regime implies that the co-owners are tenants in
common. It also implies that liens against unit apartments are
transferred to the co-owners' undivided interest in the entire prop67
erty. These matters should be expressly included in the statute.
Where there is inadequate or no insurance available and the
premises are destroyed, the costs of reconstruction are to be borne
by those co-owners "directly affected by the damage." In reality,
damage to any part of the structure affects the aesthetic composition and thus the value of the entire project. Such an interpretation of the term "directly affected" would then spread the loss to
all co-owners in the project. One writer has suggested that this
term will be interpreted to mean those co-owners who suffer some
66

67

STAT. § 76-815(2) (Supp. 1963) requires a majority of coowners to adopt decisions. "Majority of coowners" is defined in
NEB. REV.STAT. § 76-802(8) (Supp. 1963) as "more than fifty per cent
of the basic value of the property as a whole ...."
See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS AN. § 34-36-31 (Supp. 1964).
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loss of use because of the damage. 68 The same author, however,
suggests that unavoidable loss could just as easily become the
burden of the entire group, thereby adding incentive to keep the
blanket insurance adequate. If the burden is individual, each coowner will overinsure his own apartment at the expense of the
blanket policy.6 9 This reasoning seems persuasive. Unless most
of the common elements are designated as limited common elements, all co-owners will be affected by being required to pay
their proportionate share of repairs to common elements destroyed. Thus, ground level owners will be forced to pay part of
the expense of repairing a destroyed hallway on the third floor.
On the other hand, the extended use of limited common elements
also causes difficulties. An area designated as such is reserved
for the exclusive use of a certain number of apartments.7° Thus,
in a three story apartment condominium without elevator service,
the top floor hallway could be made a limited common element as
to owners on the third floor, but part of the second floor hallway
would be necessary for both second and third floor owners, and
part of the ground level hallway would be used by all owners.
The result would be the allocation of an inequitable proportion of
the common expenses to third floor owners.
The Nebraska act allows section 76-822 to be changed by
unanimous resolution of the co-owners. To protect the integrity
of the regime and to give an added incentive for the maintenance
of blanket insurance coverage, the co-owners should place the
burden of partial destruction, in the absence of sufficient insurance, on all co-owners.
IX. THE UNDESIRABLE OWNER
The combination of cooperative living with a fee simple form
of ownership creates delicate legal problems in maintaining harmony among co-owners and thus in the project itself. Once an
individual buys into the project, little control can be exercised
over him by the association. However, the Nebraska act establishes certain rules supplementing those embodied in the master
deed or bylaws which must be followed by each co-owner:
[T]he use and enjoyment of each apartment shall be subject to
the following rules:
(1)

Each apartment shall be devoted solely to the use as-

signed to it in the deed to which section 76-803 refers;
Mixon, supra note 62, at 249.
69 Id. at 252.
68

70 NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 76-802(7) (Supp. 1963).
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(2) No tenant of an apartment may make any noise or cause
any annoyance or do any act that may disturb the peace of the
other coowners or tenants;
(3) The apartments shall not be used for purposes contrary
to law, morals or normal behavior;
(4) Each coowner shall carry out at his sole expense any
works of modification, repair, cleaning, safety, and improvement
of his apartment, without disturbing the legal use and enjoyment of the rights of the other coowners, or changing the exterior
form of the facades, or painting the exterior walls, doors or windows in colors or hues different from those of the whole, and
without jeopardizing the soundness or safety of the property, reduce its value or impair any easement or access to or use of
common elements; and
(5) Every coowner or tenant shall strictly comply with the
administration provisions set forth in the deed or in the by-laws
referred to in section 76-815. Violations of these rules shall be
grounds for
an action for damages by the coowner or tenant
71
aggrieved.
Arguably, this section could be interpreted as providing an
action for damages only for violation of the "administration provisions" referred to in subparagraph (5).
However, the use of
the term "rules," both in subparagraph (5) and in the introductory sentence of the section, implies that a violation of any of the
subparagraphs, as well as provisions of the bylaws and master
deed, will give rise to an action for damages. The Nebraska court
may view such an action as an exclusive remedy 72 or as an
73
attempt to insure a legal remedy in addition to injunctive relief.
71 NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-804 (Supp. 1963).
72 "It
is a general principle of interpretation that the mention of one
thing implies the exclusion of another ....
[T]he enumeration of
certain powers inmplies the exclusion of all others not fairly incident
to those enumerated ....
" Heuftle v. Eustis Cemetery Ass'n, 171
Neb. 293, 296, 106 N.W.2d 400, 403 (1960). In New York Cent. R.R.
v. City of Bucyrus, 126 Ohio St. 558, 186 N.E. 450 (1933), it was held
that where parties to a covenant stipulate a definite remedy for
breach of a covenant in a deed, they are ordinarily relegated to the
relief thus stipulated.- Arguably, the Nebraska act would be incorporated by reference into every condominium deed.
73 The argument that the provision allowing an action for damages was
included merely to insure a legal remedy in addition to injunctive
relief would have to be based on the premise that an action for damages would not be allowed under common law or that, at least, the
validity of such an action would be questionable. In Schwoerer v.
Boylston VIkt. Ass'n, 99 Mass. 285 (1868), it was held that agreements
and stipulations may be enforced at law in an action for damages
between the original parties only. See also 2 A.=aicAN LAw oF
PROPERTY § 9.11 (Casner ed. 1952). However, in Flynn v. New York,
W. & B. Ry., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913 (1916), the New York court

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, No. 3
A co-owner may prefer to pay damages rather than abide by a
covenant.7 4 It may, therefore, be necessary for the protection of
the other co-owners to afford immediate injunctive relief rather
than to force them to suffer the effects of a violation until a judgment for damages can be rendered. Of course, even a judgment
for damages may not stop continuous violations of the rules, if the
damages awarded are minimal. Making injunctive relief expressly available in such a situation seems imperative, and it is
suggested that the act be amended accordingly. Nebraska should
also consider enacting an amendment similar to the New York
provision requiring flagrant violators to provide a surety.7 5 This
would give additional incentive for compliance with the bylaws
and also give the association or aggrieved co-owners more protection.
Although control of present co-owners is limited, most writers
on condominium suggest that a right of first refusal be incorporated into the bylaws of every project. If a co-owner receives
a firm offer to purchase, he must afford the association the opportunity to purchase his apartment on the same terms within a
held that restrictive covenants are enforceable in law and equity, and
binding upon every subsequent purchaser having notice of the plan.
See also Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq. 181, 147 Atl. 390 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1929); CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN
WITH LAND" 155 n.27 (1929).
The only Nebraska case in point held
that where an owner of a tract of land adopts a general scheme of
restrictions which is imposed on all lots conveyed, and it is shown
that the restrictions are for the benefit of each owner, any lot owner
may enforce such restrictions against other owners purchasing with
notice, actual or constructive. This case involved an equity action for
injunctive relief and the court granted the injunction, because the
remedy at law was inadequate. Dundee Realty Co. v. Nichols, 113
Neb. 389, 203 N.W. 558 (1925).
This indicates that the Nebraska
Supreme Court has recognized the existence of an action at law for
breach of a covenant running with the land and would reject the

argument that such an action would not lie.
74

75

The authority concerning the measure of damages for breach of a
restrictive covenant is divided into at least two different rules. The
first measure recognized is the difference between the value of the
benefited property as protected by the restriction and its value as not
so protected. Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq. 181, 147 Atl. 390 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1929). The second is the difference between the respective
values of the benefited property with and without the structure which
violates the covenant. Amerman v. Deane, 132 N.Y. 355, 30 N.E. 741
(1892).
"In any case of flagrant or repeated violation by a unit owner, he
may be required by the board of managers to give sufficient surety
or sureties for his future compliance with the by-laws, rules, regulations, resolutions and decisions." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-j.
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reasonable time. If the association fails to exercise its option
within the prescribed time, the owner may sell to the offeror.
The right of first refusal should be reinforced by a right of redemption, which would allow the association to repurchase a unit
if a seller violates the first refusal covenant. These two covenants would allow a reasonable screening of prospective purchas76
ers, but would not allow discrimination as to race or religion.
Three common law doctrines stand in the way of incorporating
the right of first refusal into a condominium project: the doctrine of unreasonable restraint on alienation; the rule against
perpetuities; and the requirement that covenants must run with
the land to be binding on subsequent purchasers. The Nebraska
act may allow the designation of the right of first refusal as a
covenant running with the land.7 7

Another section provides:

"The rules of property against perpetuities and restricting unreasonable restraints on alienation shall not be applied to defeat
any of the provisions of ...

[this act]."78

This may apply to a

right of first refusal, since arguably it could be a "restriction"
within section 76-809 (5).79 Nevertheless, the validity of a right of
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
77 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-809 (Supp. 1963) provides in part: "The master
deed shall express the following particulars: . .. (5) The covenants,
conditions and restrictions relating to the regime, which shall run
with the land and bind all coowners, tenants of such owners, employees and any other persons who use the property, including the
persons who acquire the interest of any coowner through foreclosure,
enforcement of any lien or otherwise." This provision is susceptible
of two interpretations. First, it may mean that the master deed must
express all of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions relating to
the regime and that all such covenants, etc., are covenants running
with the land. On the other hand, the provision could be interpreted
to mean that only those covenants, etc., which are expressly designated by the co-owners as covenants running with the land must be
expressed in the master deed. Under the first interpretation, the
right of first refusal must be included in the master deed and when
so included automatically runs with the land. Under the second interpretation, the co-owners would have to expressly stipulate that the
right of first refusal runs with the land, but this would only be evidence of an intention to make the covenant run, and the covenant
would still have to touch and concern the land. CLARK, REAL CovNANS AND OTHER INTEREsTs W icH "RuN Wrn LAm" 75 (1929).
78 NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-807 (Supp. 1963).
79 Even without statutory sanction, a right of first refusal has been upheld as a reasonable restraint in a cooperative apartment situation.
Gale v. York Center Community Co-op., Inc., 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d
30 (1960). However, in Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 817, 821, 58 N.W.2d
201, 203 (1953), the Nebraska court stated: "The validity or extent
76
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first refusal is far from certain, and the Nebraska act should be
amended to expressly allow such a restriction.8"
X. TORT AND CONTRACT LIABILITY
The Nebraska act is silent on the question of whether individual co-owners are jointly and severally liable for: (1) torts
arising out of accidents on the common elements; and (2) contracts entered into by the board of directors or the association at
large. All unit owners are tenants in common with respect to the
common elements. Therefore, liability arising out of a negligently maintained hallway, for example, might be placed on any
of the co-owners under a joint enterprise or common purpose
theory.8 '
The contractual liability of the co-owners for contracts formulated by either the board of directors or the association is
governed by the law of agency and particularly the law of volun82
tary unincorporated associations. In First Nat'l Bank v. Rector,
the Nebraska court, in exempting religious societies from the
general rule, stated the rule to be that "all the officers or members who joined in making or authorizing the contract are represented by the joint name, and they are liable upon it, on the
ground of principal and agent and not of partnership." Although
the question of when any given co-owner authorized a contract is

80
81

of one's title to real estate ought not to rest upon considerations of
reasonableness in the imposing of restrictions. Such a relaxation by
judicial interpretation can only bring confusion where certainty ought
to exist."
See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws AN. § 34-36-28 (Supp. 1963).
The doctrine of joint enterprise, with few exceptions, has been used
solely in automobile law by imputing the negligence of a driver to
a passenger. PROSSER, TORTS § 65 (2d ed. 1955). In Doleman v.
Burandt, 160 Neb. 745, 753, 71 N.W.2d 521, 525 (1955), the Nebraska

Supreme Court, in imputing the contributory negligence of one coowner of an automobile to the other co-owner, and thereby barring
recovery in the latter's suit against a third person for injury to the
automobile, stated: "We adopt this rule only in the above situation
.... It would not necessarily apply in all cases, especially where the
co-owners are parties defendant and one owner [is] operating the car.

In such a case the question of imputable negligence would still require
proof of the relationship of principal and agent, joint enterprise or
some community of interest." With respect to the common elements,
unit owners in a condominium would have the community of interest

82

and possibly the joint enterprise requirements referred to in the
above quotation.
59 Neb. 77, 79-80, 80 N.W. 269, 270 (1899).
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one of fact and intention, for the purposes of this article it is
enough that in certain situations unit owners
may be bound
83
individually upon the association's contracts.

Each unit owner should pay his just share of any liability
thus imposed, either in contract or tort. Although contribution
between joint debtors is recognized in Nebraska, 84 the ability of a

joint tortfeasor to maintain such an action is unsettled. 85 If it
were not allowed, the burden which might fall on an individual
co-owner could be intolerable.8 6 Some states have attempted to
solve the problem by statute.8 7 The easiest solution would be to
include a provision in the bylaws designating as common expense
83

Little uniformity can be found in cases involving contractual liability
of members of voluntary unincorporated associations. In Hornberger
v. Orchard, 39 Neb. 639, 58 N.W. 425 (1894), the Nebraska court held

that, in the absence of an express contract, members of such associations were not liable for debts incurred before membership was obtained. This would not apply to the purchaser of a condominium
apartment, since the statute imposes such liability. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 76-819 (Supp. 1963). For an extensive survey of the contractual
liability of members of unincorporated associations, see 42 DiCm. L.
REV. 154 (1937).
See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-316 (1956), which
allows any judgment creditor of an association to have an award of
execution against "all such persons, or any of them as may appear to
have been members of such .

.

. association" if the property of the

association is insufficient to cover the debt. An "association" within
the meaning of this statute is defined as "any company or association
of persons formed for the purpose of ... holding any species of property . . . " NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-313 (Reissue 1964). The condo-

minium is well within the definition.
84 Exchange Elevator Co. v. Marshall, 147 Neb. 48, 22 N.W.2d 403 (1946).
85 Contribution was allowed between joint tortfeasors acting in good
faith in First Nat'l Bank v. Avery Planter Co., 69 Neb. 329, 95 N.W.
622 (1903), but the authenticity of that decision was questioned by
Judge Delehant in Andromidas v. Theisen Bros., 94 F. Supp. 150 (D.
Neb. 1950). See also Comment, 37 NEB. L. REV. 820 (1958).
86 Personal liability may be limited by incorporation of the association,

87

but it is uncertain whether this would be a complete answer. Professor Berger, in his article on condominiums, suggests incorporation as
a possible solution, but notes that even with a corporate management
the corporation may be treated as an agent for the unit owners, who
would then become liable to the creditors as principals. Berger,
Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation,62 CoLUM. L. REv.
987, 1007-08 (1963).
"The owner of a unit shall have no personal liability for any damages
caused by the association on or in connection with the use of the
common elements. A unit owner shall be liable for injuries or damages occurring in his own unit ......
FLA. STAT. Amr. § 711.18(2)
(Supp. 1964).
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all tort liability arising out of common areas. 8
XI.

TAXATION

89

The Nebraska act requires that all state taxes, assessments,
and other charges be assessed against each individual apartment,
and that tax liens must be levied individually. 0 However, the
statute does not deal with property taxes or other assessments
made against the common elements. It would be within the discretion of the tax commissioner to decide whether these taxes
were also to be individually assessed on each unit owner's share
of the common areas. If a blanket assessment were levied and
not paid, a lien upon the common elements would be illusory,
since they could not be sold separately from the individual apartments.91 Also, if the lien were levied, it would cloud all unit
titles and thus destroy the advantage of financial independence.
This problem could be solved in the same manner as that involving mechanic's liens against common areas.92 Some statutes
force separate taxation on the entire holding of the unit owner,
including common elements.9 3 The Nebraska act should be
amended to contain such a provision.
XIL

WAIVER OF THE REGIME

A change in the surrounding neighborhood or an inability to
sell individual units may make retention of a condominium arrangement unsound. Thus, the Nebraska act provides that threefourths of the co-owners may vote at any time to sell the entire
property or waive the condominium regime and revert to a
tenancy in common. On such a vote, all co-owners are bound to
execute and deliver the necessary instruments in order to obtain
that result. Before such a waiver is valid, creditors holding
REV. STAT. § 76-802(13) (c) (Supp. 1963) defines common expense as "expenses agreed upon as common expenses by the associa-

88 NFx.

tion of coowners."
89

The area of federal income taxation of condominiums has been extensively explored and will not be discussed in this article. See Berger,
supra note 86; Comment, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 299 (1962); Comment, 14
HAsTnNs L.J. 270 (1963); Comment, 17 U. Amv
Note, 31 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 1014 (1963).

L.

REV.

145 (1962);

90 "The Tax Commissioner of Nebraska says it would present no problem

to tax these individually."

Hearings Before the Committee on the

Judiciary on LB 288, 73d Neb. Leg. Sess. 5 (April 24, 1963).
91 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-807 (Supp. 1963).
92

See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.

93 See, e.g., Atuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-558 (Supp. 1964).
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recorded encumbrances must agree to accept as security the un-

divided portions of the property owned by the debtor.9 4 However, any such waiver does not bar the subsequent return to a
condominium regime.9 5 This would seem to provide a cumbersome but possible solution to the undesired owner problem. If a
three-fourths majority of the co-owners wished to remove from
the project one or more of the minority, the regime could be
waived and the entire project sold to a straw man, who in turn
would reinstate the condominium regime and reconvey the
premises to the majority. In effect, the rest of the co-owners
could buy out a recalcitrant member.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Nebraska, like many states, has taken a step forward in the
passage of the Condominium Property Act. It has, for the most
part, taken adequate steps in providing a sound legal foundation
for condominium development. Although this article primarily
has attempted to raise problems pertaining to the statute, the Nebraska act has solved many of the legal difficulties which the
common law could not solve. It has eliminated common law
rules, applicable to conventional real property ownership, which
are contrary to the nature of the condominium concept. However,
condominium projects involve the investment of large sums of
money, and legal certainty is a prerequisite for such investment.
To attain this legal certainty, the following provisions, previously
suggested in this article, should be included, where possible, in
the internal organization of the project through declarations and
bylaws, or in the alternative by statutory amendment:
1. A provision by statute or bylaw allowing potential purchasers to examine the records of the association for assessments
against individual units. 98
2. A statutory provision allowing a flexible procedure for
adjusting the respective proportional valuations of individual
97

units.

3. A statutory provision changing the basis for determining
the percentage of common elements owned by each co-owner and
liability of each co-owner for common expenses. 98
91

NsE. REV.

STAT.

§ 76-812 CSupp. 1963).

NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-813 (Supp. 1963).
95 See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
97 See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
98 See text accompanying note 51
supra.
95
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4. A provision by statute or bylaw dealing with the distribution of common profits.99
5. A statutory provision governing mechanic's and materialman's liens against common areas. 0 0
6. A statutory provision allowing the actual value of each
unit to be taken into consideration in assessing that unit's share
of premiums for blanket insurance. 10
7. A complete change and clarification of sections 76-821 and
76-822, dealing with the partial or complete destruction of the
02
project.
8. A provision by statute or bylaw placing the cost of partial
destruction of the condominium on all unit owners, thus insuring
10 3
incentive to keep the blanket insurance policy adequate.
9. A statutory provision expressly allowing injunctive relief
as well as an action for damages against unit owners who violate
10 4
covenants and bylaws.
10. The inclusion in the bylaws of covenants of right of first
refusal and right of redemption. 0 5
11. A statutory provision expressly exempting the right of
first refusal from operation of the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation and the rule against perpetuities. 10 6
12. A provision by statute or bylaw that all tort liability
10 7
arising from common areas be charged as common expense.
13. A statutory provision requiring individual taxation of
each co-owner's entire estate, including his pro rata share of com08
mon elements.
Harvey S. Perlman '66

99 See text
See text
101 See text
102 See text
103 See text
104 See text
105 See text
106 See text
100

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

note 52 supra.
notes 53-55 supra.
notes 58-59 supra.
notes 64-67 supra.
notes 68-70 supra.
notes 71-75 supra.
note 76 supra.
notes 77-80 supra.
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See text accompanying notes 81-88 supra.
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See text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.

